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1 Introduction
The use of comparative statics is at the foundation of the study of behavior in
economics. Under certainty, the income and substitution eﬀects are building
blocks for the understanding of the eﬀects of parameter changes on optimal
behavior. However, the notions of income and substitution eﬀects have not
had the same impact on the comparative statics for optimal behavior under
uncertainty. The reason is that comparative statics under uncertainty began
with Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) in the portfolio problem with a one-
dimensional utility function.1 In their papers (as well as all applications
with a one-dimensional utility function in the literature), there is no income
eﬀect. Hence, the comparative analysis in the portfolio problem depends
only on the substitution eﬀect. This is not the case with a multidimensional
utility function (i.e., several goods) as shown by Kihlstrom and Mirman
(1974) (KM). It is in KM that the notions of income and substitution eﬀects
are ﬁrst used to study the eﬀect of risk aversion in the multidimensional
case. Recently, Mirman and Santugini (2013) (MS) used the income and
substitution eﬀects to study the behavior of optimal decisions due to changes
in risk aversion in a general multidimensional setting under uncertainty.
Since virtually all aspects of behavior have to deal with uncertainty (e.g.,
consumers face uncertainty about prices and income.), it is important to un-
derstand the comparative analysis under uncertainty. Moreover, although
the comparative analysis in the portfolio problem under uncertainty in the
one-dimensional case is a natural ﬁrst step, the comparative statics prop-
erties in the general multidimensional expected utility framework must be
studied. In the multidimensional case, the eﬀect of uncertainty on optimal
behavior combines both tastes (i.e., ordinal preferences) and attitudes to-
ward risk (i.e., risk aversion). In order to study the eﬀect of risk aversion
on optimal behavior, the eﬀects of tastes and risk aversion must be identi-
ﬁed. This is done by KM which generalizes the notion of risk aversion to the
multidimensional case by introducing utility representations that are concave
1Speciﬁcally, Arrow (1965) considers the eﬀect of changing income in the portfolio
problem. Pratt (1964), on the other hand, deals with changes in risk aversion on optimal
decisions.
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transformations of each other. It is precisely this deﬁnition of risk aversion
that MS used to characterize the eﬀect of risk aversion on optimal behavior.
It is the purpose of this paper to study the eﬀect of changing income on
optimal decisions in the multidimensional expected utility framework. To
that end, we use the KM utility representation to highlight the role of risk
aversion on the comparative analysis. Indeed, the introduction of uncer-
tainty is always implicitly accompanied by assumptions regarding attitudes
toward risk. In the general utility representation, it is not very diﬃcult to do
comparative statics and obtain income and substitution expressions that are
expectations of the classical income and substitution eﬀects. However, these
expectations do not reveal the role played by risk aversion in determining
optimal behavior. In other words, with the general utility representation,
risk aversion is implicit.
The general utility representation is thus inappropriate to present com-
parative statics results under uncertainty since it hides the role of risk aver-
sion. In order to obtain the proper eﬀect of changing income, we use the
KM utility representation to make the role played by risk aversion explicit.
Using the KM utility representation, we show that the comparative analy-
sis under uncertainty is founded on classical demand theory under certainty
and is linked to the eﬀect of changing risk aversion, which also depends on
classical demand theory.
More speciﬁcally, we study the eﬀect of changing income in the consumption-
saving problem when the rate of return is random. We ﬁrst decompose the
eﬀect of a change in income on both the sure good and the risky good. We
show that the eﬀect of changing income depends on the now explicit change in
risk aversion. Speciﬁcally, the eﬀect of changing income can be decomposed
into a modiﬁed income eﬀect and a hybrid eﬀect. The modiﬁed income eﬀect
captures the eﬀect of changing income through uncertainty and the hybrid
eﬀect captures the eﬀect of changing risk aversion due to changes in income.
The hybrid eﬀects are related to the pure risk aversion eﬀect contained in
MS.
Using the decomposition, we then study the direction of the eﬀect of a
change in income. In general, the sign of the modiﬁed income eﬀect depends
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on the normality of the goods whereas the sign of the hybrid eﬀect depends
on both tastes and attitudes toward risk. We consider both constant and
decreasing absolute risk aversion. Whether risk preferences exhibit constant
or decreasing absolute risk aversion, it is shown that an increase in income
always increases the amount of the sure good. However, the eﬀect of chang-
ing income has an ambiguous eﬀect on the risky good. In particular, suppose
that both goods are normal and risk preferences exhibit decreasing absolute
risk aversion. On the one hand, the normality of the risky good induces more
consumption of the risky good when income increases. On the other hand,
as income increases, the individual becomes less risk averse, which, under
certain conditions regarding the income and substitution eﬀects, induces less
consumption of the risky good. Hence, the overall eﬀect of increasing income
is ambiguous. One implication of our results is that there is no equivalence
between Pratt’s portfolio theorem (Pratt, 1964) and Arrow’s portfolio theo-
rem (Arrow, 1965) in the multidimensional case.
Finally, we discuss the appropriateness of an alternative approach to
study risk aversion suggested by Selden (1978), which has been widely popu-
larized through the parametric model of Epstein and Zin (1989) (henceforth,
the Selden-EZ approach). We show that the Selden-EZ approach cannot be
used to isolate the eﬀect of risk aversion. In particular, the comparative
analysis under the Selden-EZ approach yields outcomes that are inconsistent
with ordinal preferences.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model
and discuss the KM approach. Section 3 presents the comparative analysis.
Section 4 concludes the paper by discussing the Selden-EZ approach.
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2 KM Framework
The eﬀect of uncertainty on optimal behavior in the multidimensional case
combines both tastes (i.e., ordinal preferences) and attitudes toward risk
(i.e., risk aversion). In order to study the eﬀect of risk aversion on optimal
behavior, the eﬀects of tastes and risk aversion must be identiﬁed. This
issue does not arise for the class of one-dimensional strictly increasing utility
functions since tastes are represented by the natural ordering on the real line,
i.e., xA > xB means that xA  xB. However, the relationship between the
utility representation, uncertainty, risk aversion, and tastes is much more
delicate in the multidimensional case since there is no natural order. In
other words, diﬀerent utility functions incorporate diﬀerent tastes as well as
diﬀerent attitudes toward risk so that the link between risk aversion and risk
averse behavior cannot be clearly identiﬁed.2
In this section, we use the approach established by KM for the study of
the eﬀect of risk aversion on optimal behavior under uncertainty in the multi-
dimensional case. When going from certainty to uncertainty, risk aversion is
always implicit. Hence, uncertainty and risk aversion are naturally entangled
with each other. In other words, the eﬀect of uncertainty on behavior cannot
be studied without taking account of the role played by risk aversion.
To show the intricacies of optimal behavior under uncertainty, it is useful
to begin with a general utility representation. In that case, risk aversion,
implicit in optimal behavior, cannot in general be recognized. To remedy
that problem, we consider utility functions that are concave transformations
of each other as studied in KM. Studying optimal behavior under uncertainty
using the KM framework makes the role of risk aversion explicit. Moreover,
this representation clariﬁes the relationship between uncertainty and risk
aversion as well as their distinct roles on optimal behavior. We apply the KM
framework to the consumption-saving problem under uncertainty and derive
optimal behavior. In the next section, we highlight the role of risk aversion
for the eﬀect of changing income on optimal behavior in the consumption-
2For instance, KM provides an example in which the preference between a sure outcome
and a gamble depends solely on tastes and not on risk aversion. See Appendix A.
6
saving problem under uncertainty.
General Utility Representation. Consider an individual making deci-
sions under uncertainty. Let the consumption proﬁle (x, y˜) ∈ R2+ have utility
representation V (x, y˜). In the stochastic environment, x is the sure good
and y˜ is the risky good due to the presence of randomness in the budget
constraint. Speciﬁcally, the maximization problem under uncertainty is
max
x
Eε˜V (x, Z(x, ε˜, I)), (1)
where Eε˜ is the expectation operator over a random shock ε˜. The risky
good depends on the sure good x, the random shock ε˜ and the income I
through a budget constraint, i.e., y˜ = Z(x, ε˜, I). Assuming that the second-
order condition is satisﬁed, optimal consumption is deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order
condition corresponding to (1), i.e.,
Eε˜
[
∂V (x, Z(x, ε˜, I))
∂x
+
∂V (x, Z(x, ε˜, I))
∂y˜
∂Z(x, ε˜, I)
∂x
]
= 0 (2)
evaluated at x = x∗.
Although implicit, Expression (2) is uninformative regarding the eﬀect
of risk aversion on optimal behavior under uncertainty. In particular, the
general utility representation confounds risk aversion and tastes. Indeed,
consider the eﬀect of changing income on the sure good. That is, using (2),
∂x∗
∂I
S
= Eε˜
[
∂2U(x, Z(x, ε˜, I))
∂x∂y˜
∂Z(x, ε˜, I)
∂I
+
∂U(x, Z(x, ε˜, I))
∂y˜
∂2Z(x, ε˜, I)
∂x∂I
]
(3)
where
S
= means of the same sign as. Expression (3) does not make risk aver-
sion explicit and provides no information on how risk aversion inﬂuences the
comparative analysis. In fact, from expression (3), it appears that uncer-
tainty has minimal eﬀect on optimal behavior, i.e., removing the expectation
operator in (3) yields the eﬀect of changing income on the sure good in a
deterministic environment. It looks as if there is no risk aversion eﬀect al-
though the introduction of uncertainty cannot occur without regard to risk
aversion. Hence, the general utility representation hides the intricacies of
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optimal behavior under uncertainty.
KM utility representation. In order to clarify the relationship be-
tween uncertainty and risk aversion as well as their distinct roles on op-
timal behavior, the KM utility representation is adopted. Formally, let
V (x, y˜) ≡ ϕ (U(x, y˜)) be the utility associated with the consumption pro-
ﬁle (x, y) ∈ R2+. Here, ϕ is a strictly increasing and concave function,
ϕ′ > 0, ϕ′′ ≤ 0 and U(x, y˜) is a quasiconcave function. Under the KM
utility representation, tastes and attitudes toward risk are not confounded.
Indeed, U(x, y˜) refers to tastes as well as attitudes toward risk whereas ϕ
reﬂects changes in risk aversion. Speciﬁcally, a more concave ϕ (and, thus,
a more concave V ) means that the individual is more risk-averse. Concave
transformations of the utility function alter the expected marginal rate of
substitution in a way that is consistent with ordinal preferences, but do not
alter the deterministic marginal rate of substitution. In particular, with the
KM approach, attitudes towards risk (i.e., the concavity of ϕ) is independent
of any gamble.
Using the KM utility representation, the maximization problem under
uncertainty deﬁned by (1) is rewritten as
max
x
Eε˜ϕ (U(x, Z(x, ε˜, I))) . (4)
Using (4), optimal consumption is deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order condition the
ﬁrst-order condition
Eε˜ϕ
′ (U(x, Z(x, ε˜, I))) ·MU(x, Z(x, ε˜, I)) = 0 (5)
evaluated at x = x∗. Here,
MU(x, Z(x, ε˜, I)) ≡ ∂U(x, Z(x, ε˜, I))
∂x
+
∂U(x, Z(x, ε˜, I))
∂y˜
∂Z(x, ε˜, I)
∂x
(6)
is the marginal utility of consumption for the sure good. Unlike (2), expres-
sion (5) makes risk aversion explicit through the term ϕ′ (U(x, Z(x, ε˜, I))). It
is also clear that risk aversion and tastes are entwined. In particular, chang-
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ing income has an eﬀect on both attitudes toward risk and the marginal
utility of consumption. That is, for the sure good, using (5),
∂x∗
∂I
S
= Eε˜ϕ
′′ (U(x, Z(x, ε˜, I))) ·MU(x, Z(x, ε˜, I))2
+ ϕ′ (U(x, Z(x, ε˜, I))) · ∂MU(x, Z(x, ε˜, I))
∂I
. (7)
Unlike expression (3), expression (7) highlights the importance of the role
of risk aversion for the comparative analysis through the concavity of ϕ.
However, while (7) is more informative than (3), it remains to analyze the
inﬂuence of attitudes toward risk (e.g., constant or decreasing absolute risk
aversion) and tastes (e.g., normal or income-neutral goods) on the compara-
tive analysis. To that end, we turn to a classical application.
Application to Consumption-Saving Problem. We now apply the
KM approach to the consumption-saving problem under uncertainty. We
present the model and derive optimal behavior. In the next section, we
perform a comparative analysis of the eﬀect of changing income on optimal
behavior.
Consider an individual making consumption and saving decisions under
uncertainty. As noted, in the stochastic environment, x is the sure good
and y˜ is the risky good due to the presence of randomness in the budget
constraint. Speciﬁcally, the individual is endowed with income I > 0 from
which x ∈ (0, I) is consumed and the remaining s ≡ I − x is saved in a risky
asset with the random gross return R˜. Given the random budget constraint,
it follows that y˜ = R˜(I − x).
To facilitate the discussion, we adopt a binary distribution for the rate of
return of the risky asset and consider additive preferences.
Assumption 2.1. R˜ ∼ (π◦R, (1−π)◦R) such that π ∈ (0, 1) and 0 < R < R.
Assumption 2.2. U(x, y˜) = u1(x) + u2(y˜) such that u
′
1, u
′
2 > 0, u
′′
1, u
′′
2 ≤ 0.
Additive preferences allows us to study several types of tastes. If u′′1, u
′′
2 < 0,
then both goods are normal. If u′′1 = 0, u
′′
2 < 0 or u
′′
1 < 0, u
′′
2 = 0, then
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preferences are quasilinear. Finally, u′′1 = u
′′
2 = 0 refers to a situation in which
both goods are income-neutral as in the Arrow-Pratt portfolio problem.3
Given Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 and y˜ = R˜(I − x), (4) is rewritten as4
max
x∈(0,I)
πϕ
(
u1(x) + u2(R(I − x))
)
+ (1− π)ϕ (u1(x) + u2(R(I − x))) . (8)
Optimal consumption is deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order condition corresponding
to (8), i.e.,
πϕ′
(
u1(x
∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
) · [u′1(x∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R]
+ (1− π)ϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) · [u′1(x∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R] = 0 (9)
evaluated at x = x∗ so that the amount allocated to the risky good is
s∗ ≡ I − x∗. Here, for R ∈ {R,R}, u′1(x∗) − u′2(R(I − x∗))R is the de-
terministic marginal utility of consumption for the sure good. From (9), the
KM utility representation makes risk aversion explicit in optimal behavior
under uncertainty. Speciﬁcally, since ϕ′′ < 0, it follows that
0 < ϕ′
(
u1(x
∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
)
< ϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) . (10)
Hence, risk aversion adds more weight to the deterministic marginal utility
corresponding to the lowest rate of return.
In the next section, we use (9) to analyze the eﬀect of changing income
on optimal behavior. Under certainty, the income and substitution eﬀects
play an important role in determining the signs of the comparative statics.
However, under uncertainty, the income and substitutions eﬀects play an
additional part in the comparative statics because they are also involved
in signing the eﬀect of risk aversion. This relationship between the income
and substitution eﬀects and the risk aversion eﬀect was pointed out in MS.
Speciﬁcally, MS characterizes the eﬀect of changing risk aversion on the basis
of the income and substitution eﬀects under diﬀerent sources of uncertainty.
In other words, MS studies the pure risk aversion eﬀect, i.e., the change in
3In the Arrow-Pratt portfolio problem, V (x, y˜) = ϕ (x+ y˜).
4Note that, in this formulation, V (x, y˜) = ϕ (u1(x) + u2(y˜)) cannot be additive.
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both the sure good and the risky good due to a change in risk aversion. In
this paper, for the case of a random price of the risky good (i.e., the rate of
return on the risky good), we show that the eﬀect of changing risk aversion
is part of the eﬀect of changing income. Note that, for the pure risk aversion
eﬀect, income remains constant so that the change in the risky good oﬀsets
the change in the sure good. In the problem of changing income studied in
this paper, the pure risk aversion eﬀect must be modiﬁed to take account of
the change in income.
Before proceeding, note that the income and substitution eﬀects (re-
lated to a deterministic change in the rate of return) order the deterministic
marginal utility of consumption for the sure good. To simplify the discus-
sion, we hereafter refer to income and substitution eﬀects without mentioning
that these eﬀects are related to a deterministic change in the rate of return.
Formally,5
Remark 2.3. u′1(x
∗) − u′2(R(I − x∗))R > 0 > u′1(x∗) − u′2(R(I − x∗))R if
and only if the income eﬀect is stronger than the substitution eﬀect.6
5LetMU(x,R; I) ≡ u′1(x)−u′2(R(I−x))R so that ∂MU(x,R; I)/∂R|x=x∗ = −u′′2(R(I−
x∗))R2 − u′2(R(I − x∗)) where −u′′2(R(I − x∗))R2 > 0 and −u′2(R(I − x∗)) < 0 are
proportional to and of the same sign as the income eﬀect and the substitution eﬀect,
respectively, related to a deterministic change in R.
6Note that we implicitly ignore the case in which the income and substitution eﬀects
cancel each other since, in this case, uncertainty has no eﬀect on optimal behavior and
risk aversion is thus irrelevant.
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3 Comparative Analysis
We study, in this section, the eﬀect of changing income on the sure good
x∗, as well as the risky good through the amount saved, i.e., s∗ ≡ I −
x∗.7 From (9), a change in income aﬀects optimal behavior through the
inﬂuence on risk aversion as well as the marginal utility of consumption.
We proceed in several steps. We ﬁrst decompose the eﬀect of a change in
income for the sure good and the risky good. We show that the eﬀect of
changing income depends on the eﬀect of changing risk aversion. We then
study the eﬀect of changing income under diﬀerent assumptions regarding
attitudes toward risk and tastes. Finally, we show that in general there is
no equivalence between Pratt’s portfolio theorem (Pratt, 1964) and Arrow’s
portfolio theorem (Arrow, 1965).
Decomposition of the Eﬀect of Changing Income. We begin by
decomposing the eﬀect of changing income on the sure good. Propositions 3.1
states that the eﬀect of changing income is determined by the sum of two
terms, i.e., MIEx∗ +HEx∗ . The term MIEx∗ corresponds to the modiﬁed
income eﬀect on the sure good, i.e., the income eﬀect modiﬁed by uncertainty.
It has the same characteristics as the deterministic income eﬀect, however it
is modiﬁed to take account of the fact that the rate of return is random. The
term HEx∗ is the hybrid eﬀect that contains the eﬀect of a change in risk
aversion modiﬁed by the change in income. In other words, MIEx∗ captures
the eﬀect of changing income on the sure good through uncertainty whereas
HEx∗ captures the eﬀect of changing risk aversion due to changes in income.
As noted, the symbol
S
= means of the same sign as.
7Speciﬁcally, a change in income changes the amount allocated to the risky good (i.e.,
savings), which induces a change in the distribution of the risky good. The eﬀect of
changing income on the risky good simply refers to the eﬀect of changing income on
savings.
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Proposition 3.1. From (9),
∂x∗
∂I
S
= MIEx∗ +HEx∗ (11)
where
MIEx∗ ≡ − πϕ′
(
u1(x
∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
)
u′′2(R(I − x∗))R2
− (1− π)ϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) u′′2(R(I − x∗))R2 (12)
and
HEx∗ ≡ − πϕ′
(
u1(x
∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
) [
u′1(x
∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R
]
·
(
−ϕ′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
ϕ′
(
u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
) u′2(R(I − x∗))R
− −ϕ
′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
ϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) u
′
2(R(I − x∗))R
)
. (13)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 3.2 complements Proposition 3.1 by decomposing the eﬀect of
increasing income on s∗. As in the case of the sure good, the eﬀect of changing
income on the risky good is determined by both a modiﬁed income eﬀect and
a hybrid eﬀect. However, these eﬀects are diﬀerent, i.e., MIEx∗ 	= MIEs∗
and HEx∗ 	= HEs∗ .
Proposition 3.2. From (9),
∂s∗
∂I
S
= MIEs∗ +HEs∗ (14)
where
MIEs∗ ≡ − πϕ′
(
u1(x
∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
)
u′′1(x
∗)
− (1− π)ϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))u′′1(x∗) (15)
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and
HEs∗ ≡ πϕ′
(
u1(x
∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
)
u′1(x
∗)
[
u′1(x
∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R
]
·
(
−ϕ′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
ϕ′
(
u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
) − −ϕ′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
ϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
)
.
(16)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Two comments are in order for the case of additive preferences. First,
from (12) and (15), MIEx∗ ≥ 0 and MIEs∗ ≥ 0. Whether the modiﬁed
income eﬀects are zero or strictly positive depends on the normality of the
goods. Speciﬁcally, MIEx∗ > 0 when the sure good is normal and MIEs∗ >
0 when the risky good is normal. Hence, the signs of the modiﬁed income
eﬀects are independent of changes in risk aversion, and depend solely on
ordinal preferences, i.e., tastes. Second, from (13) and (16), the signs of
HEx∗ and HEs∗ depend on both attitudes toward risk and tastes. In other
words, the hybrid eﬀects combine the eﬀect of risk aversion with changes in
income on risk aversion. Although the functional forms of the hybrid eﬀects
diﬀer between the two goods, both HEx∗ and HEs∗ are due to risk aversion,
which is made explicit in our formulation.
Note that these hybrid eﬀects are related to the pure risk aversion eﬀect
contained in MS. Indeed, in MS, the pure risk aversion eﬀect is shown to
depend on the income and substitution eﬀects, i.e., the sign of u′1(x
∗) −
u′2(R(I − x∗))R. Formally, let a > 0 be a coeﬃcient of risk aversion such
that an increase in a implies an increase in risk aversion. That is, for any z,
∂ (−ϕ′′(z)/ϕ′(z)) /∂a > 0. Hence, from MS,8
∂x∗
∂a
S
= − [u′1(x∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R] . (17)
However, with changes in income, the hybrid eﬀect contains both changes in
risk aversion and changes in income. In other words, the eﬀect of changing
8Since there is no increase in income with the pure risk aversion eﬀect, it follows that
∂x∗
∂a = −∂s
∗
∂a .
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income depends on the pure risk aversion eﬀect through the hybrid eﬀects.
However, the hybrid eﬀects are not completely analogous to the pure risk
aversion eﬀects because they are modiﬁed to take account of the changes in
income, i.e., the changes in the level of utility, and thus alters the impact of
the pure risk aversion eﬀect.
To see this, rewrite the hybrid eﬀects. For the sure good,
HEx∗ S= ∂x
∗
∂a
·
(
−ϕ′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
ϕ′
(
u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
) u′2(R(I − x∗))R
− −ϕ
′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
ϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) u
′
2(R(I − x∗))R
)
(18)
where ∂x
∗
∂a
is deﬁned by (17). For a change in income, the terms u′2(R(I −
x∗))R and u′2(R(I − x∗))R representing changes in the marginal rates of
substitution are weights for the change in risk aversion due to income. These
terms combined determines the strength of the pure risk aversion eﬀect for the
hybrid eﬀect. In other words, as income changes, not only does risk aversion
change but tastes are also distorted so that the pure risk aversion eﬀect is
altered. The terms in parenthesis in (18) take account of the inﬂuence of
both changes in risk aversion and changes in tastes on the pure risk aversion
eﬀect. Hence, the sign of the hybrid eﬀect depends on the interaction between
risk aversion, income and substitution eﬀects. From (18), the income and
substitution eﬀects play a dual role in determining the sign of the eﬀect
of changing income. First, it orders the marginal utilities explicit in (18)
which are used as weights for the eﬀect of income on risk aversion. Here,
the weights depend on the diﬀerent levels of utility consistent with diﬀerent
levels of income. Second, it determines the sign of the pure risk aversion
eﬀect in (17) embedded in (18).
For the risky good, the income and substitution eﬀects inﬂuence the sign
of HEs∗ (and thus ∂s∗/∂I) only through the risk aversion eﬀect. As in (18),
the eﬀect of changing risk aversion inﬂuences the eﬀect of changing income
in a multiplicative way. In that case, the hybrid eﬀect is the product of
the eﬀect of risk aversion and the eﬀect of income on risk aversion without
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additional weights. That is, (15) is equivalent to
HEs∗ S= −∂x
∗
∂a
·
(
−ϕ′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
ϕ′
(
u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
) − −ϕ′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
ϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
)
(19)
where ∂x
∗
∂a
is deﬁned by (17). Note ﬁnally that the hybrid eﬀects in (18)
and (19) can also be rewritten in terms of the eﬀect of risk aversion on the
risky good since ∂x
∗
∂a
= −∂s∗
∂a
.9
Using Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 for the case of additive preferences, we
now proceed to determine the direction of a change in income on optimal
behavior under uncertainty. We then show that in general there is no equiv-
alence between Pratt’s portfolio theorem (Pratt, 1964) and Arrow’s portfolio
theorem (Arrow, 1965).
Direction of a Change in Income. We ﬁrst consider the case of con-
stant absolute risk aversion and then analyze the case of decreasing absolute
risk aversion. For each case, we discuss four situations. We begin with the
case in which both goods are income-neutral as in the Arrow-Pratt portfolio
problem. We then continue with quasilinear preferences and ﬁnish with both
goods being normal.
Suppose that risk preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion.
First, Proposition 3.3 shows that the hybrid risk aversion eﬀect is diﬀer-
ent for the sure good and the risky good.10 Proposition 3.3 states that under
constant absolute risk aversion, the hybrid eﬀect is present for the sure good
but absent for the risky good. Speciﬁcally, the hybrid eﬀect for the sure good
is strictly positive due to the presence of risk aversion (i.e., ϕ′′ < 0). In other
words, the eﬀect of changing income for the sure good in this case dominates
the eﬀect of risk aversion, and thus the amount of the sure good increases.
However, the hybrid eﬀect for the risky good is zero because, under constant
absolute risk-aversion, an increase in income has no eﬀect on the individual’s
9Note also that the term representing changes in tastes as income changes seems to
disappear. However, it can be seen from (18) to be the term u′2(x
∗), which, due to the
representation of preferences by additive utility, factors out.
10Note that for the case of pure risk aversion from MS, the eﬀect of a change in risk
aversion is the same (except for the signs) for both the sure good and the risky good.
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risk aversion.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that risk preferences exhibit constant absolute
risk-aversion. i.e.,
−ϕ
′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
ϕ′
(
u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
) = −ϕ′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
ϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) . (20)
Then,
1. From (13),
HEx∗ ≡ − πϕ′′
(
u1(x
∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
) [
u′1(x
∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R
]2
− (1− π)ϕ′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) [u′1(x∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R]2 > 0.
(21)
2. From (16), HEs∗ = 0.
Under constant absolute risk aversion, we now consider diﬀerences re-
garding the normality of the goods. Proposition 3.4 states that with constant
absolute risk aversion, when the risky good is income-neutral, a change in
income is entirely allocated to the sure good, regardless of whether the sure
good is normal (i.e., u′′2 = 0) or income-neutral (i.e., u
′′
2 = 0). In particular,
under constant absolute risk aversion, a change in income does not aﬀect risk
aversion. Hence, since the risky good is income-neutral, the individual has
no incentive to increase the amount of the risky good.
Proposition 3.4. Suppose that risk preferences exhibit constant absolute risk
aversion and that the risky good is income-neutral. Then,
∂x∗
∂I
= 1, (22)
∂s∗
∂I
= 0. (23)
Proof. Suppose that the risky good is income neutral, i.e., u′′1 = 0. Then,
from (14), (15), (16), and (20), ∂s
∗
∂I
= 0. Since s∗ ≡ I − x∗, it follows that
∂x∗
∂I
= 1.
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Consider next quasilinear preferences with the sure good income-neutral
and the risky good normal. In that case, an increase in income induces an
increase in both goods. Since the risky good is normal, the amount of the
risky good increases because the modiﬁed income eﬀect is strictly positive.
As in Proposition 3.4, the sure good increases through the hybrid eﬀect,
although not as much since part of the new income is used for the risky
good. While consumption of both goods increase with an increase in income,
the reason for the increases are diﬀerent. Indeed, the sure good increases
because of risk aversion and the change in income through the hybrid eﬀect
whereas the risky good increases only because of the change in income.
Proposition 3.5. Suppose that risk preferences exhibit constant absolute risk
aversion. If the sure good is income-neutral and the risky good is normal, then
1. ∂x
∗
∂I
∈ (0, 1) due only to the hybrid eﬀect, i.e., MIEx∗ = 0,HEx∗ > 0.
2. ∂s
∗
∂I
∈ (0, 1) due only to the modiﬁed income eﬀect, i.e.,
MIEs∗ > 0,HEs∗ = 0.
Finally, Proposition 3.6 states that when both goods are normal, an in-
crease in income increases both the sure good and the risky good. Going
from an income-neutral sure good to a normal sure good ampliﬁes the posi-
tive eﬀect of increasing income on the sure good.
Proposition 3.6. Suppose that risk preferences exhibit constant absolute risk
aversion. If both goods are normal, then
1. ∂x
∗
∂I
∈ (0, 1) due to the modiﬁed income and hybrid eﬀects, i.e.,
MIEx∗ > 0,HEx∗ > 0.
2. ∂s
∗
∂I
∈ (0, 1) due only to the modiﬁed income eﬀect, i.e.,
MIEs∗ > 0,HEs∗ = 0.
Next, suppose that risk preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aver-
sion. Proposition 3.7 states that under decreasing absolute risk aversion,
the hybrid eﬀect for the sure good is strictly positive whereas the hybrid
eﬀect for the risky good is positive or negative depending on the income and
substitution eﬀects.
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Proposition 3.7. Suppose that risk preferences exhibit decreasing risk aver-
sion, i.e.,
−ϕ
′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
ϕ′
(
u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
) < −ϕ′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
ϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) . (24)
Then,
1. From (13), HEx∗ > 0.
2. From (16), HEs∗ > 0 if and only if the substitution eﬀect is stronger
than the income eﬀect.
Proof. See Appendix B.
We now consider decreasing absolute risk aversion with diﬀerent assump-
tions regarding the normality of the goods. Proposition 3.8 states that when
both goods are income-neutral, then an increase in income induces the indi-
vidual to increase both the sure good and the risky good. To understand this,
note that from MS, due to the substitution eﬀect when the price of the risky
good is random, a reduction in risk aversion induces the individual to de-
crease the sure good and increase the risky good. Under decreasing absolute
risk aversion, an increase in income also induces a reduction in risk aversion,
which then implies an increase in the risky good through the hybrid eﬀect.
However, unlike the eﬀect of increasing risk aversion, the level of income has
increased, which ampliﬁes the increase in the consumption of the sure good.
Proposition 3.8. Suppose that risk preferences exhibit decreasing absolute
risk aversion and that both goods are income-neutral. Then,
1. ∂x
∗
∂I
∈ (0, 1) due only to the hybrid eﬀect, MIEx∗ = 0,HEx∗ > 0.
2. ∂s
∗
∂I
∈ (0, 1) due only to the hybrid eﬀect, MIEs∗ = 0,HEs∗ > 0.
Suppose that preferences are quasilinear with the sure good income-
neutral (i.e., u′′2 = 0) and the risky good normal (i.e., u
′′
1 < 0). As in
Proposition 3.8, the positive eﬀect of increasing income on the sure good
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is due to the hybrid eﬀect. For the risky good, the hybrid eﬀect is positive
due to the substitution eﬀect since there is no income eﬀect (i.e., u′′2 = 0).
Compared to a income-neutral risky good, the positive eﬀect of increasing
income on the risky good is accentuated now that the risky good is normal.
Indeed, for the risky good, both the modiﬁed income eﬀect and the hybrid
eﬀect push in the direction of more consumption of the risky good.
Proposition 3.9. Suppose that risk preferences exhibit decreasing absolute
risk and that the sure good is income-neutral and the risky good is normal.
Then,
1. ∂x
∗
∂I
∈ (0, 1) due only to the hybrid eﬀect, i.e., MIEx∗ = 0,HEx∗ > 0.
2. ∂s
∗
∂I
∈ (0, 1) due to the modiﬁed income and hybrid eﬀects, i.e., MIEs∗ >
0,HEs∗ > 0.
Suppose next that preferences are quasilinear but now the sure good is
normal (i.e., u′′2 < 0) and the risky good is income-neutral (i.e., u
′′
1 = 0).
Here, the normality of the sure good makes the sign of the hybrid eﬀect
for the risky good ambiguous through the eﬀect of increasing risk aversion.
When the substitution eﬀect is stronger than the income eﬀect, the new
income is allocated between the two goods. However, when the income eﬀect
is stronger than the substitution eﬀect, the hybrid eﬀect for the risky good
is negative, which reduces consumption for the risky good.
Proposition 3.10. Suppose that risk preferences exhibit decreasing absolute
risk aversion and that the sure good is normal and the risky good is income-
neutral.
1. If the substitution eﬀect is stronger than the income eﬀect, then ∂x
∗
∂I
, ∂s
∗
∂I
∈
(0, 1).
2. If the income eﬀect is stronger than the substitution eﬀect, then ∂x
∗
∂I
> 1
and ∂s
∗
∂I
< 0.
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From Propositions 3.9 and 3.10, the normality of the good in quasilinear
preferences has a profound eﬀect on the comparative analysis. In the case
of an income-neutral sure good, an increase in income is allocated to both
sure and risky goods. The increase in the sure good is due to the eﬀect of
increasing income on risk aversion whereas the increase in the risky good is
due to a pure income eﬀect. In the case of an income-neutral risky good,
the normality of the sure good makes it possible for the hybrid eﬀect cor-
responding to the risky good to be negative. In that case, an increase in
income induces an increase in the sure good (due to the presence of more
income) as well as a reallocation from the risky good to the sure good due to
the pure risk aversion eﬀect contained in the hybrid eﬀect for the risky good.
In that case, ∂x
∗
∂I
> 1.
Suppose ﬁnally that both goods are normal, (i.e., u′′1, u
′′
2 < 0). In that
case, the eﬀect of increasing income on the risky good is ambiguous. Here,
the normality of the risky good (i.e., u′′1 < 0) makes the modiﬁed income
eﬀect positive so that the individual increases savings. At the same time,
the fact that u′′2 < 0 makes it possible for the hybrid eﬀect to reduce savings.
This happens if the income eﬀect is stronger than the substitution eﬀect.
Proposition 3.11. Suppose that risk preferences exhibit decreasing absolute
risk aversion and that both goods are normal. Then, ∂x
∗
∂I
> 0 and
1. If the substitution eﬀect is stronger than the income eﬀect, then ∂s
∗
∂I
> 0
due to the modiﬁed income and hybrid eﬀect, i.e., MIEs∗ > 0,HEs∗ >
0.
2. If the income eﬀect is stronger than the substitution eﬀect, then ∂s
∗
∂I
< 0
if and only if MIEs∗ +HEs∗ < 0.
On Equivalence. Finally, we show that in general there is no equiva-
lence between Pratt’s portfolio theorem (Pratt, 1964) and Arrow’s portfolio
theorem (Arrow, 1965). Indeed, the equivalence depends on the assumption
regarding tastes, i.e., whether goods are normal or income-neutral. It also
depends on the fact that it is the price of the risky good that is random. In-
deed, if income or the price of the sure good were random, the result would
change.
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We begin with the Arrow-Pratt portfolio problem in which both goods
are income-neutral, i.e., V (x, y˜) = ϕ (x+ y˜). For Arrow (1965), increasing
income when risk preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion makes
the individual less risk averse and thus the amount allocated to the risky
good is increased while, for Pratt (1964), increasing risk aversion decreases
the amount of the risky good, so that a decrease in risk aversion increases
the risky good.
In the case of income-neutral goods, the modiﬁed income eﬀect is absent
and thus the eﬀect of changing income is entirely linked to the eﬀect of
changing risk aversion through the hybrid eﬀect, i.e., using (19) and ∂x
∗
∂a
=
−∂s∗
∂a
, decreasing absolute risk aversion implies that
∂s∗
∂I
S
= HEs∗ (25)
∂s∗
∂a
S
= −HEs∗ (26)
Moreover, since the sure good is income-neutral, the substitution eﬀect is
dominant so that HEs∗ < 0. Proposition 3.12 follows immediately.
Proposition 3.12. (Arrow-Pratt) Suppose that both goods are income-neutral.
Then, the following two statements are equivalent.
1. An decrease in risk aversion decreases the amount allocated to the risky
good.
2. When risk preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion, an in-
crease in income decreases the amount allocated to the risky good.
Suppose now that the risky good is normal and the sure good is income-
neutral, i.e., V (x, y˜) = ϕ (u1(x) + y˜). Hence, MIEs∗ > 0 whereas HEs∗ < 0
due to the substitution eﬀect as in the case of two income-neutral goods. The
equivalence does not hold since the positive modiﬁed income eﬀect induces
more consumption for the risky good. Speciﬁcally, if the positive modiﬁed
income eﬀect is stronger than the negative hybrid eﬀect, then, under DARA,
an increase in income induces more consumption for the risky good. On the
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other hand, a decrease in risk aversion induces less consumption for the risky
good.
Proposition 3.13. Suppose that the sure good is income-neutral and that
the risky good is normal. Then, the following two statements are not equiv-
alent.
1. An decrease in risk aversion increases the amount allocated to the risky
good if and only if the modiﬁed income eﬀect is stronger than the hybrid
eﬀect.
2. When risk preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion, an in-
crease in income decreases the amount allocated to the risky good due
to the substitution eﬀect.
Finally, suppose that both goods are normal. As in the previous case,
the normality of the risky good implies that an increase in income induces
more consumption of the risky good through the modiﬁed income eﬀect (i.e.,
MIEs∗ > 0). However, the normality of the sure good implies that an in-
crease in income induces less consumption of the risky good through the
hybrid eﬀect (i.e., HEs∗ < 0) if the income eﬀect is stronger than the sub-
stitution eﬀect. Note that the source of the nonequivalence is solely due to
the normality of the risky good. Indeed, because the normality of the sure
good aﬀects the sign only through the hybrid eﬀect which is directionally
equivalent to the sign of the eﬀect of risk aversion, the normality of the sure
good reinforces the equivalence result in the case of two income-neutral goods
while the normality of the risky good pulls in the opposite direction.
Proposition 3.14. Suppose that both goods are normal. Then, the following
two statements are not equivalent.
1. A decrease in risk aversion decreases the amount allocated to the risky
good if and only if the income eﬀect is stronger than the substitution
eﬀect.
2. When risk preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion, an in-
crease in income increases the amount allocated to the risky good if and
only if the modiﬁed income eﬀect is stronger than than the hybrid eﬀect.
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Hence, for the risky good, the equivalence is not general. Consider next
the sure good. Proposition 3.15 states that for the sure good there is no
equivalence between the Arrow result and the Pratt result. In the case of
the sure good, an increase in income induces more consumption of the sure
good. This is regardless of the normality of the goods since MIEx∗ ≥ 0 and
under DARA HEx∗ > 0. However, the eﬀect of risk aversion depends on the
income and substitution eﬀects.
Proposition 3.15. The following two statements are not equivalent.
1. An decrease in risk aversion increases the sure good if and only if the
income eﬀect is stronger than the substitution eﬀect.
2. When risk preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion, an in-
crease in income increases the sure good.
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4 Discussion
Having studied the eﬀect of changing income on optimal behavior and high-
lighted the role of classical demand theory and risk aversion on comparative
statics, we now discuss the appropriateness of an alternative approach to
study risk aversion suggested by Selden (1978), which has been widely pop-
ularized through the parametric model of Epstein and Zin (1989) (EZ).
Speciﬁcally, in this section, we present the eﬀects of changing income
and changing risk aversion on optimal behavior under uncertainty using EZ
preferences. We then compare these comparative statics results with the
ones corresponding to the KM approach. In Appendix C, we explain why
the Selden-EZ preferences cannot be used to isolate the eﬀect of risk aversion.
As noted in Appendix C, the Selden-EZ approach uses the certainty
equivalent to reﬂect risk aversion. Formally, given (44), for any gamble g
on (x, y˜), the Selden-EZ utility function is WS(x, y˜) = u1(x) + u2(μ(y˜, vS)),
where μ(y˜, vS) = v
−1
S (Ey˜vS(y˜)) is the certainty equivalent. Here, Ey˜ is the
expectation operator with respect to y˜ and vS is a strictly increasing and
concave function, v′S > 0, v
′′
S ≤ 0. In the Selden-EZ approach, a decrease in
μ(y˜, vS) due to a more concave vS is used to mean that the individual is more
risk averse.
Consider now the EZ parametric model. That is, suppose that u1(z) =
u2(z) = z
1−ρ and vS(z) = z1−γ , γ 	= 1, where γ represents the one-dimensional
coeﬃcient of risk aversion and the parameter ρ represents the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution under certainty. Hence, given Assumption 2.1 and
y˜ = R˜(I − x), the consumption-saving problem under EZ preferences is
max
x
x1−ρ +
(
πR1−γ(I − x)1−γ + (1− π)R1−γ(I − x)1−γ
) 1−ρ
1−γ
. (27)
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From (27), optimal consumption under EZ preferences is11
xEZ =
I
1 +
(
πR1−γ + (1− π)R1−γ
) 1−ρ
(1−γ)ρ
, (28)
sEZ =
(
πR1−γ + (1− π)R1−γ
) 1−ρ
(1−γ)ρ
I
1 +
(
πR1−γ + (1− π)R1−γ
) 1−ρ
(1−γ)ρ
. (29)
We now perform a comparative analysis on expressions (28) and (29).
Remark 4.1 states that the eﬀect of income on behavior under EZ preferences
is to increase both the sure and the risky amount. For the case of a change in
income, EZ preferences disregard the eﬀect of an increase in income on risk
aversion, which, under decreasing absolute risk aversion, makes the individual
less risk averse.
Remark 4.1. From (28) and (29), ∂xEZ/∂I, ∂sEZ/∂I > 0.
Remark 4.2 states that under EZ preferences an increase in the one-
dimensional coeﬃcient of risk aversion γ leads to an increase in the sure
good and thus a decrease in the risky good. Indeed, from (28) and (29), an
increase in γ decreases the term
(
πR1−γ + (1− π)R1−γ
) 1−ρ
(1−γ)ρ
. Hence, EZ
preferences ignore the role played by the income and substitution eﬀects as
shown in MS in order to determine the eﬀect of changing risk aversion.
Remark 4.2. From (28) and (29), ∂xEZ/∂γ > 0 and ∂sEZ/∂γ < 0.
11Taking the ﬁrst-order condition corresponding to (27) yields (28). Plugging (28) into
sEZ ≡ I − xEZ yields (28).
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A KM Example
To show that attitudes toward risk and tastes are not separated, we recall
the example stated in KM. Let V 1(x, y) and V 2(x, y) be two distinct utility
functions yielding indiﬀerence curves of the type IC1 and IC2, respectively, as
depicted in Figure 1. Let (xA, yA) and (xB, yB) be two distinct consumption
bundles such that V 1(xA, yA) > V
1(xB, yB) and V
2(xA, yA) < V
2(xB, yB).
Consider choosing between the sure outcome yielding (xA, yA) and a gamble
yielding (xA, yA) with probability π ∈ (0, 1] and (xB, yB) with probability
1− π.
y
x
IC1
IC2
(xB, yB)
(xA, yA)
Figure 1: KM Example
Consistent with Figure 1, an individual with preferences V 1(x, y) prefers
the sure outcome, while an individual with preferences V 2(x, y) prefers the
gamble.12 The individual with preferences V 2(x, y) acts in a seemingly more
12In other words, V 1(xA, yA) > πV
1(xA, yA) + (1 − π)V 1(xB, yB) and V 2(xA, yA) <
πV 2(xA, yA) + (1− π)V 2(xB , yB).
27
risk-averse way than the individual with preferences V 1(x, y), but is not
more risk-averse. Rather, it is the composition of goods in the gamble that
is preferred.
B Proofs
Proof of Propositions 3.1 and 3.2. From (9),
∂x∗
∂I
=
Ω
−Δ (30)
and, since s∗ ≡ I − x∗,
∂s∗
∂I
= 1− Ω−Δ , (31)
where
Ω ≡
(
ϕ′′
(
u1(x
∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
)
ϕ′
(
u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
) u′2(R(I − x∗))R
− ϕ
′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
ϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) u
′
2(R(I − x∗))R
)
· πϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) [u′1(x∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R]
− πϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) u′′2(R(I − x∗))R2
− (1− π)ϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) u′′2(R(I − x∗))R2 (32)
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and
Δ ≡
(
ϕ′′
(
u1(x
∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
)
ϕ′
(
u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
) [u′1(x∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R]
− ϕ
′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
ϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) [u
′
1(x
∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R]
)
· πϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) [u′1(x∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R]
+ πϕ′
(
u1(x
∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
) [
u′′1(x
∗) + u′′2(R(I − x∗))R
2
]
+ (1− π)ϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
[
u′′1(x
∗) + u′′2(R(I − x∗))R2
]
.
(33)
Note that the second-order condition implies that Δ < 0. Rearranging (30)
and (31) yields the decomposition stated in Propositions 3.1 and 3.2.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Let
Δ = − πϕ′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) [u′1(x∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R]2
− (1− π)ϕ′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) [u′1(x∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R]2
(34)
which is negative since ϕ′′ < 0. Expression (34) can be rewritten as
Δ =
−ϕ′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
ϕ′
(
u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
) πϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) [u′1(x∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R]2
+
−ϕ′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
ϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) (1− π)ϕ
′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
· [u′1(x∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R]2 . (35)
Multiplying both sides of (9) by [u′1(x
∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R] yields
(1− π)ϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) · [u′1(x∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R]2
= −πϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) · [u′1(x∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R] [u′1(x∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R] .
(36)
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Plugging (36) into (35) yields
Δ =
−ϕ′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
ϕ′
(
u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
) πϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) [u′1(x∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R]2
− −ϕ
′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
ϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) πϕ
′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
· [u′1(x∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R] [u′1(x∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R] , (37)
=
−ϕ′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
ϕ′
(
u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
) (u′2(R(I − x∗))R− u′2(R(I − x∗))R)
(38)
πϕ′
(
u1(x
∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
) · [u′1(x∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R] , (39)
= HEx∗ . (40)
Proof of Proposition 3.7. Let
Γ = πϕ′′
(
u1(x
∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
) [
u′1(x
∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R
]2
+ (1− π)ϕ′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) [u′1(x∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R]2 < 0.
(41)
Using (9), we can rewrite the above as
Γ =
(
ϕ′′
(
u1(x
∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
)
ϕ′
(
u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
) [u′1(x∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R]
− ϕ
′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
ϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) [u
′
1(x
∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R]
)
· πϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) [u′1(x∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R] < 0 (42)
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so that
πϕ′
(
u1(x
∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
) [
u′1(x
∗)− u′2(R(I − x∗))R
]
·
(
−ϕ′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
ϕ′
(
u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
) u′2(R(I − x∗))R
− −ϕ
′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
ϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) u
′
2(R(I − x∗))R
)
<
(
ϕ′′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗)))
ϕ′ (u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))) −
ϕ′′
(
u1(x
∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
)
ϕ′
(
u1(x∗) + u2(R(I − x∗))
)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
u′1(x
∗).
(43)
The left-hand side of the above equation is HEx∗ so that HEx∗ > 0
whether risk preferences exhibit CARA or DARA.
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C Discussion
In this appendix, we discuss the appropriateness of an alternative approach to
study risk aversion suggested by Selden (1978). We show that the Selden-EZ
approach cannot be used to isolate the eﬀect of risk aversion.
Two approaches have been suggested to disentangle tastes from risk aver-
sion, and, thus, to analyze the eﬀect of risk aversion on behavior. The ﬁrst
established by Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) (henceforth, KM) considers the
class of utilities that are concave transformations. Formally, let
U(x, y) = u1(x) + u2(y), (44)
u′1, u
′
2 > 0, u
′′
1, u
′′
2 ≤ 0 be the utility associated with the consumption proﬁle
(x, y) ∈ R2+.13 Given (44), for any gamble g on (x, y˜) in which x is the sure
good and y˜ is the risky good, the KM utility function is
WKM(x, y˜) = Ey˜vKM (u1(x) + u2(y˜)) , (45)
where Ey˜ is the expectation operator with respect to y˜, and vKM is a strictly
increasing and concave function, v′KM > 0, v
′′
KM ≤ 0.14
As noted, the KM approach can be used to study the eﬀect of risk aversion
on behavior because concave transformations of the utility function alter the
expected marginal rate of substitution in a way that is consistent with ordinal
preferences. To see this, consider the two gambles,
gA ≡
(
π ◦ (xA, yA), (1− π) ◦ (xA, yA)
)
, (46)
gB ≡
(
π ◦ (xB, yB), (1− π) ◦ (xB, yB)
)
, (47)
where, for i = A,B, y
i
< yi and π ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of receiving
(xi, yi) in gamble i. We make two further restrictions. First, the gambles are
not on the same vertical lines, i.e., xA < xB. Second, yA > yB and yA > yB,
13We consider additive utility functions only for clarity. The discussion applies to more
general utility functions.
14Note that, in this formulation, WKM cannot be additive.
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Figure 2: Case 1
i.e., y˜A ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates y˜B.
Suppose that ordinal preferences over the bundles are as depicted in Fig-
ure 2, i.e.,
u1(xA) + u2(yA) = u1(xB) + u2(yB), (48)
u1(xA) + u2(yA) = u1(xB) + u2(yB). (49)
Proposition C.1 states that a KM concave transformation does not alter the
ordering of these two gambles. Indeed, from (46), (47), (48), and (49), the
KM utilities for the two gambles are identical, i.e.,
πvKM
(
u1(xA) + u2(yA)
)
+ (1− π)vKM (u1(xA) + u2(yA))
= πvKM
(
u1(xB) + u2(yB)
)
+ (1− π)vKM (u1(xB) + u2(yB)) . (50)
Formally,
33
yx
(xB, yB)
(xB, yB)
(xA, yA)
(xA, yA)
Figure 3: Case 2
Proposition C.1. Suppose (48) and (49) hold. Under KM preferences, for
any concave transformation vKM , an individual is indiﬀerent between gamble
A and gamble B.
Suppose next that ordinal preferences over the bundles are as depicted in
Figure 3, i.e.,
u1(xA) + u2(yA) < u1(xB) + u2(yB), (51)
u1(xA) + u2(yA) = u1(xB) + u2(yB). (52)
That is, in terms of utility levels, gamble A is strictly worse than gamble B.
Proposition C.2 states that, regardless of the concave transformation vKM ,
gamble B is always strictly preferred to gamble A. Indeed, for π ∈ [0, 1),
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WKM(xA, y˜A) < WKM(xB, y˜B).
15 Formally,
Proposition C.2. Suppose (51) and (52) hold, and π ∈ [0, 1). Under KM
preferences, for any concave transformation vKM , gB  gA.
The second approach suggested by Selden (1978) uses the certainty equiv-
alent as a measure of risk aversion. Formally, given (44), for any gamble g
on (x, y˜), the Selden-EZ utility function is
WS(x, y˜) = u1(x) + u2(μ(y˜, vS)), (54)
where
μ(y˜, vS) = v
−1
S (Ey˜vS(y˜)) (55)
is the certainty equivalent. Here, Ey˜ is the expectation operator with respect
to y˜ and vS is a strictly increasing and concave function, v
′
S > 0, v
′′
S ≤ 0.
In the Selden-EZ approach, a decrease in μ(y˜, vS) due to a more concave
vS is used to mean that the agent is more risk averse. The basis for this
approach is the certainty equivalence of the one dimensional Arrow-Pratt
theory of risk-aversion. However, while there is an equivalence between a
positive risk premium (or a certainty equivalent) and a concave transforma-
tion of the utility function in the one-dimensional case, this is not true in the
multidimensional case.
In fact, unlike KM preferences, Selden-EZ preferences distort the expected
marginal rate of substitution in a way that yields choices that are inconsistent
with ordinal preferences. Selden-EZ preferences do not fall into the same
category as the KM preferences because Selden-EZ preferences do not follow
from a concave transformation. Indeed, a change in the concavity of vS is
equivalent to a concave transformation on the second utility function u2.
This partial concave transformation in Selden-EZ preferences is the reason
15From (46), (47), (51), and (52), for π ∈ [0, 1),
πvKM
(
u1(xA) + u2(yA)
)
+ (1− π)vKM (u1(xA) + u2(yA))
< πvKM
(
u1(xB) + u2(yB)
)
+ (1 − π)vKM (u1(xB) + u2(yB)) . (53)
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that the Selden-EZ utility representation conﬂates tastes with risk aversion.
Moreover, unlike the KM measure of risk aversion, the Selden-EZ measure
of risk aversion can only be studied when there is a speciﬁc gamble. Indeed,
without a gamble, preferences revert to the original deterministic preferences,
so that vS is only relevant with respect to a speciﬁc gamble.
The problems with the choice of gambles in the Selden-EZ approach is
subtler than in the KM example of Figure 1. The KM example does not
apply to Selden-EZ preferences because Selden-EZ preferences represent the
same deterministic preferences, i.e., the same indiﬀerence curves. However,
Selden-EZ preferences do not represent consistent preferences over gambles
since changes in the concavity of vS also changes tastes for gambles. In order
to show this inconsistency, we need a more subtle example using the fact
that deterministic preferences are the same. In fact, we can use the gambles
deﬁned by (46) and (47) to show that an inconsistency arises. Suppose
that the ordinal preferences over the bundles are as depicted in Figure 2.
In contrast to Proposition C.1, Proposition C.3 states that the Selden-EZ
approach alters the ordering of these two gambles. In fact, gamble A can
be preferred to gamble B because the expected return on the risky good
y˜A is strictly greater than the expected return on the risky good y˜B. This
is important because it shows that Selden-EZ preferences disregard tastes
in favor of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance on the value of outcomes in the
risky good. Moreover, the fact that Selden-EZ preferences chooses gamble
A is unrelated to the riskiness of the values of the risky good. In fact, from
Figure 2, even though gamble A is preferred, yA − yA > yB − yB.
Proposition C.3. Suppose (48) and (49) hold. Under Selden-EZ prefer-
ences, gamble A can be strictly preferred to gamble B.
Proof. Let
fA(π) = u1(xA) + u2
(
v−1S
(
πvS(yA) + (1− π)vS(yA)
))
, (56)
fB(π) = u1(xB) + u2
(
v−1S
(
πvS(yB) + (1− π)vS(yB)
))
, (57)
be the Selden-EZ utilities as a function of π. From (48), (49), (56), and (57),
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fA(0) = fB(0) and fA(1) = fB(1). Moreover,
f ′A(π) =
u′2
(
v−1S
(
πvS(yA) + (1− π)vS(yA)
))(
vS(yA)− vS(yA)
)
v′S
(
v−1S
(
πvS(yA) + (1− π)vS(yA)
)) < 0,
(58)
f ′B(π) =
u′2
(
v−1S
(
πvS(yB) + (1− π)vS(yB)
))(
vS(yB)− vS(yB)
)
v′S
(
v−1S
(
πvS(yB) + (1− π)vS(yB)
)) < 0.
(59)
Evaluating (58) and (59) at π = 1 yields
f ′A(π)|π=1 =
u′2(yA)
(
vS(yA)− vS(yA)
)
v′S(yA)
< 0, (60)
f ′B(π)|π=1 =
u′2(yB)
(
vS(yB)− vS(yB)
)
v′S(yB)
< 0. (61)
When y
A
is close to y
B
,
f ′A(π)|π=1 < f ′B(π)|π=1 < 0, (62)
so that for some π ∈ (0, 1) close to π = 1, fA(π)|π≈1 > fB(π)|π≈1, i.e., gamble
A is strictly preferred to gamble B.
Suppose next that the ordinal preferences over the bundles are as depicted
in Figure 3. In contrast to Proposition C.2, Proposition C.4 states that the
ordering over the two gambles can be inconsistent with ordinal preferences.
That is, gamble A which is strictly worse (in terms of utility outcomes) than
gamble B can be chosen under the Selden-EZ approach. Moreover, the fact
that Selden-EZ preferences chooses gamble A is unrelated to the riskiness
of the utilities corresponding to the values of the risky good. In fact, from
Figure 3, even though u2(yA) − u2(yA) > u2(yB) − u2(yB), gamble A is
preferred. It should also be noted that, for given π ∈ (0, 1) for which gamble
A is strictly preferred to gamble B, increasing the concavity of vS eventually
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leads to a reversal of the ordering of the gambles, i.e., for very concave vS,
gamble B is preferred to gamble A. Indeed, as vS becomes more concave,
the certainty equivalent tends toward the lowest utility, and, from (51), the
individual no longer neglects the issue of tastes and jumps back to gamble
B.
Proposition C.4. Suppose (51) and (52) hold. Under Selden-EZ prefer-
ences, gamble A can be preferred to gamble B.
Proof. From (51), (52), (56), and (57), fA(0) = fB(0) and fA(1) < fB(1).
Moreover, evaluating (58) and (59) at π = 0 yields
f ′A(π)|π=0 =
u′2(yA)
(
vS(yA)− vS(yA)
)
v′S(yA)
< 0, (63)
f ′B(π)|π=0 =
u′2(yB)
(
vS(yB)− vS(yB)
)
v′S(yB)
< 0. (64)
When u and vS are such that both
16
u′2(yA)
v′S(yA)
<
u′2(yB)
v′S(yB)
(66)
and
vS(yA)− vS(yA) < vS(yB)− vS(yB), (67)
then
0 > f ′A(π)|π=0 > f ′B(π)|π=0, (68)
so that for some π ∈ (0, 1) close to π = 0, fA(π)|π≈0 > fB(π)|π≈0, i.e., gamble
A is strictly preferred to gamble B.
Propositions C.3 and C.4 show that the certainty equivalent in the multi-
dimensional case cannot be compared in a meaningful way when considering
gambles that are on diﬀerent vertical lines, i.e., gi ≡ (π ◦ (xi, yi), (1 − π) ◦
16This occurs when, for all z,
u′′2(z)
u′2(z)
<
v′′S(z)
v′S(z)
. (65)
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(x′i, y
′
i)), xi 	= x′i, yi 	= y′i.17 In fact, implicit in the comparison across diﬀer-
ent vertical lines are the tastes or preferences corresponding to the points on
these two diﬀerent vertical lines. Changing the concavity of vS in Selden-EZ
preferences thus conﬂate risk aversion and tastes.
As noted, the inconsistency regarding ordinal preferences occurs because
the expected marginal rate of substitution is distorted by the Selden-EZ
approach. To see this, we now present the expected marginal rate of substi-
tution under both KM and Selden-EZ preferences. Consider the gamble
g ≡ (π ◦ (x, y + ε), (1− π) ◦ (x, y − ε)) (69)
for π ∈ (0, 1) and y > ε ≥ 0.
Using (45), the KM utility function is
WKM(x, y˜) = πvKM(u1(x)+u2(y+ε))+(1−π)vKM(u1(x)+u2(y−ε)), (70)
where v′KM > 0, v
′′
KM ≤ 0. Here, the expected marginal rate of substitution
is
∂y
∂x
= − u
′
1(x)
ρ(vKM)u′2(y + ε) + (1− ρ(vKM))u′2(y − ε)
, (71)
where
ρ(vKM) ≡ πv
′
KM(u1(x) + u2(y + ε))
πv′KM(u1(x) + u2(y + ε)) + (1− π)v′KM(u1(x) + u2(y − ε))
.
(72)
Note that, for a given gamble, since the two values of y˜ occur on separate
indiﬀerence curves, the expected marginal rate of substitution is a convex
combination of the marginal rates of substitution under certainty. Using (54),
the Selden-EZ utility function is rewritten as
WS (x, y + ε˜) = u1(x) + u2 (μ(y + ε˜, vS)) , (73)
17Only gambles that have their same ﬁrst argument (i.e., gambles on the same vertical
line) can be compared, e.g., gi ≡ (π ◦ (x, yi), (1 − π) ◦ (x, y′i)), yi 	= y′i using the certainty
equivalent approach. That is, it is only when restricting attention to gambles on a vertical
line that an increase in the concavity of vS (yielding a decrease in the certainty equivalent)
is related to risk aversion.
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where
μ(y + ε˜, vS) = v
−1
S (πvS(y + ε) + (1− π)vS(y − ε)) (74)
is the certainty equivalent. Here, the expected marginal rate of substitution
is
∂y
∂x
= − u
′
1(x)
u′2(μ(y + ε˜, vS))
∂μ(y+ε˜,vS)
∂y
< 0. (75)
On the one hand, from (71), the KM approach aﬀects the weights on the
marginal utilities of the second argument, without aﬀecting the values on
the marginal utilities themselves. On the other hand, from (75), with the
Selden-EZ approach, the marginal utility of the second argument is evaluated
at the certainty equivalent and is distorted by the derivative of the certainty
equivalent with respect to the outcome of y. This distortion has the eﬀect of
changing the ordering preferences over the gambles.
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